The truth about lying:  the memorial effects of deliberately producing misinformation by Vieira, Kathleen M.
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Master's Theses Graduate School
2012
The truth about lying: the memorial effects of
deliberately producing misinformation
Kathleen M. Vieira
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, kvieir1@tigers.lsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses
Part of the Psychology Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU
Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation




















Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 














Kathleen M. Vieira 






Table of Contents 
Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………………. iii 
Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………… 1 
Current Experiment ………………………………………………………………………… 11 
Method …………………………………………………………………………………………. 13 
Participants .………………………………………………………………………………… 13 
Materials …………………………………………………………………………………… 13 
Design and Procedure ……………………………………………………………………… 13 
Results ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 17 
Post-Session Questions …………………………………………………………………….. 17 
Source Memory Accuracy …………………………………………………………………. 17 
Accurate and False Memory for Having Studied Items …………………………………… 19 
Source Accuracy Response Times .………………………………………………………… 24 
Discussion ……………………………………………………………………………………… 26 
References ……………………………………………………………………………………… 31 
Appendix: IRB Form…………………………………………………………………………… 34 






There are different ways of lying and these lies may have different impacts on memory.  In this 
study, participants studied pictures of objects, and later lied and told the truth about these and 
other objects by describing them or by denying they had seen them.  Forty-eight hours later, 
participants were tested on their source memory.  Results revealed that participants had good 
memory for having falsely described a never-seen object, but poor memory for having falsely 
denied seeing a studied object.  These results suggest that telling certain types of lies may make a 
person more likely to forget having lied at all.  In addition, repeated truthful denials of having 
seen a picture paradoxically increased false memories for having seen it.  Thus, telling the truth 






Imagine a scenario in which a criminal investigator is interviewing a suspect.  In this 
situation, it is very possible that the suspect may lie to the investigator in order to avoid 
prosecution.  If the suspect does in fact lie, this can clearly affect the outcome of the 
investigation.  Because of this, there has been great interest in finding ways to detect lies as a 
means to help investigators (e.g., Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010).  However, the act of lying may 
also impact the person who lies (i.e., his or her own memory).  There is substantially less 
research on this question (e.g., Pickel, 2004).  The current study asks whether people are able to 
correctly monitor when they have lied and when they have told the truth, as well as whether the 
act of lying can affect what is later remembered about the original event.  
Research has amply demonstrated that people can confuse one memorial source for 
another (e.g., for a review, see Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993).  For example, research 
has shown that a person can come to believe that information that was suggested following a 
witnessed event was actually viewed during that event (e.g., Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; 
Zaragoza & Lane, 1994).  However, this and other research has also demonstrated that the 
likelihood of making a source confusion error can vary according to a number of factors (e.g., 
Lane, 2006; Marsh & Hicks, 1998; for a recent review see Lindsay, 2008).  One common trait of 
these studies is that participants are told to try to be accurate in the way they learn, rehearse, or 
report information.  In contrast, very few studies have examined the consequences of deliberately 
fabricating information on subsequent memory (e.g., Pickel, 2004).  The goal of the following 
study is to examine how different types of lies affect source memory accuracy.   
 Lying involves willfully generating information that is counter to the actual truth in an 
attempt to deceive another person (Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981).  Although few 
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studies have examined the effects of this behavior on memory, there is substantial research on 
situations where people are asked to read, hear or generate information that is inconsistent with 
their original memory.  One prominent literature examines eyewitness suggestibility (e.g., Loftus 
et al., 1978; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994), in which participants are provided with misleading 
information concerning an event that was previously witnessed.  More specifically, participants 
are shown an event in the laboratory, and are then given information that does not coincide with 
specific details of the original event.  Providing participants with such misleading post-event 
information can distort their memories for what was actually seen or experienced, a phenomenon 
known as the “misinformation effect” (see Loftus, 2005 for review).  
In a series of studies, Loftus et al. (1978) investigated the memorial effects of such 
misleading post-event information.  Participants viewed a series of slides, during which a car was 
shown stopped at a road sign.  Some participants saw the car stopped at a stop sign, whereas 
others saw the car stopped at a yield sign.  After viewing the slides, all participants completed a 
questionnaire concerning what they had seen.  One of the questions either corresponded or 
conflicted with information from the slideshow (i.e., either mentioned the same or a different 
road sign from what participants had seen).  Participants who were given contradictory 
information after witnessing the event had less accurate memories for the original slides.  In 
other words, the misinformation affected their reports of what they had actually seen.  
This “misinformation effect” can be explained as ineffective source monitoring.  The 
source-monitoring framework explains how source monitoring – the processes used to determine 
the origin of a memory – occurs (Johnson et al., 1993).  According to this framework, memories 
contain features or characteristics that represent the conditions under which they were encoded 
(e.g., perceptual information, affective information, and cognitive operations).  Different sources 
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of information have particular associated features or characteristics.  The differences between the 
features of different possible sources can be used to decide the source of a memory.  Source 
monitoring errors occur when people don’t have or don’t use these types of characteristic 
information to distinguish between possible sources of a memory.  Such monitoring errors can 
lead people to incorrectly attribute their memories of suggested information to their memories of 
an actual event.  Furthermore, research has shown that sometimes people really do come to 
“remember” the suggested information as coming from the original event (Zaragoza & Lane, 
1994).  In a series of experiments, Zaragoza and Lane (1994) had participants view slides 
depicting an office theft, and then exposed them to misinformation concerning what they had 
seen.  In Experiment 4 of this study, some participants were explicitly warned that they had 
received misleading information concerning the original event.  In Experiment 5 of this study, 
participants’ possible bias to respond that they had seen suggested items in both the original 
slides and the subsequent questions was addressed by removing this both option from the 
memory test.  Despite alleviating potential demand characteristics and responses biases, 
misinformation effects were still found.  These results indicate that sometimes source 
misattributions after exposure to misinformation are in fact due to false memories of seeing the 
suggested information in the original event.  Zaragoza and Lane refer to this phenomenon as the 
source misattribution effect.   
Most studies of eyewitness suggestibility rely upon manipulations where participants are 
exposed to misinformation without being told the information is false.  Furthermore, the 
misinformation is provided and thus they do not have to generate this information or even 
explicitly elaborate upon it (although see Lane & Zaragoza, 2007).  One exception to this 
methodology comes from a line of research on forced fabrication (e.g., Ackil & Zaragoza, 1998; 
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for a review see Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2008).  Ackil and Zaragoza (1998) looked at the effects of 
self-generated misinformation by having participants confabulate responses to unanswerable 
questions.  Participants watched a video depicting two brothers at summer camp.  After watching 
the video, participants answered questions concerning what they had just seen.  Some of the 
questions were unanswerable in that their answers would require knowledge of details that were 
not actually seen in the video.  However, some participants were instructed to provide an answer 
for all questions, even when they did not know the answer.  Therefore, experimenters were 
forcing these participants to fabricate answers and produce misinformation themselves.  Ackil 
and Zaragoza found that participants were later more likely to misattribute the details they had 
fabricated to the original video than they were to misattribute control details to the original 
video.  They interpreted these results to mean that forcing participants to confabulate answers 
can lead to false memories for these confabulated details.  
The effects of forced fabrication can be considered an inability of participants to correctly 
attribute misinformation to themselves.  This inability can be explained by the source-monitoring 
framework (Johnson et al., 1993).  Reality monitoring refers to the processes involved in 
discriminating between memories from internal and external sources (Johnson & Raye, 1981).  
In other words, reality monitoring is a type of source monitoring where one of the sources of 
information is the person themself.  According to this model, internally generated and externally 
generated memories differ on several dimensions.  More specifically, internally generated 
memories will be associated with more cognitive operations, and externally generated memories 
will have more contextual, sensory, and semantic details.  Reality monitoring errors can occur 
when a memory does not exhibit such characteristic features or when the characteristics of the 
different sources are very similar (Johnson & Raye, 1981).  In the forced fabrication study 
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previously mentioned (Ackil & Zaragoza, 1998), forcing participants to confabulate answers led 
them to construct memory representations that were more perceptually and contextually 
elaborate, and thus increased misattributions of the self-produced misinformation to the original 
event.  
One thing to note about forced fabrication research is that although participants do 
confabulate their responses (because the questions are not answerable using information from the 
witnessed event), they are not always aware they are producing incorrect information.  Because 
the generation phase is often days or weeks after the original event, participants may believe they 
have simply forgotten what they had seen.  Often they express that they have low confidence in 
their responses or that they are speculating.  Only in some cases do participants actively resist 
producing a response because they are certain the specified circumstances did not occur.  
Furthermore, the misinformation is provided in the context of questioning (e.g., “It [the chair] 
broke, and Delaney fell on the floor.  Where was he bleeding?” when Delaney fell but was not 
bleeding during the event) and participants are asked to elaborate upon it (e.g., Ackil & 
Zaragoza, 1998).  This situation is very different from the act of deliberately creating false 
information in an attempt to deceive another person.  Lying, in this case, is a deliberate act of 
deception that is “an intentional and conscious act that is directed at another person” (Zuckerman 
et al., 1981, p. 3).  If participants produce lies concerning stimuli or an event that they previously 
witnessed, they are essentially producing self-generated misinformation in a deliberate manner. 
Whether or not lies will produce effects similar to those found in previous 
misinformation studies is a question that has only recently been studied.  Pickel (2004) attempted 
to investigate this issue by having participants deliberately produce lies during a series of 
interview questions.  Participants watched a video of a mock crime involving two characters and 
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were later interviewed about what they had witnessed.  Some participants were instructed to 
intentionally fabricate details about the target character, and others were instructed to answer all 
questions truthfully.  The results indicated that deliberately lying about the target character led to 
less accurate memories for that target character, had no effect on memory for the secondary 
character, and in some cases seemed to lead participants to believe their own lies.  
Although Pickel (2004) showed that lying could decrease the accuracy of memory for the 
person (i.e., item memory), she did not assess whether participants remembered which person 
they lied about (although there were only two possible targets, a robber and a clerk).  In other 
words, the impact of lying on source memory cannot be ascertained from Pickel’s study.  
Although different in format from classic misinformation studies (e.g., Loftus et al., 1978), one 
other study examined the impact of lying on memory and may offer insight into the potential 
effects of lying on source memory.  Interestingly, this autobiographical memory study found that 
deliberately fabricating details about childhood events that did not occur led participants to 
become more confident that these events did not happen (Polage, 2004).  Specifically, Polage 
(2004) had participants complete a Life Events Inventory (LEI) where they rated the likelihood 
of different events happening to them before they were 10 years old (e.g., if they had been 
hospitalized overnight).  Two weeks later, participants returned and were again presented with 
the LEI items, but this time responses of “yes” (indicating that the event did happen to the 
participant) or “no” (indicating that the event did not happen to the participant) were provided 
for each item.  If an item had the response “yes” listed, the participant had to write about the 
event.  If the item had the response “no” listed, the participant had to write about how they knew 
the event did not happen to them.  If the response listed contradicted the participant’s actual 
response (i.e., if an item that participants had originally rated as very unlikely to have happened 
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to them before the age of 10 was listed with a “yes” response), they were told to lie in their 
written description (i.e., to describe the event as if it had happened).  One week later, participants 
returned and verbally provided the same stories.  One week after that, participants returned for a 
final time and were tested on their memories for what events were truthful and which were lies.  
Polage found that repeatedly lying about a childhood event (i.e., creating a fabricated story about 
an event that never happened) led most participants to become more confident that the false 
event had not actually happened to them as children.  In both experiments of her study, however, 
Polage did find a minority (10% and then 16%) of participants who eventually became extremely 
confident that the fabricated event did happen to them.   
One thing to note about Polage’s (2004) study is that participants only told one type of 
lie: lying by describing an event that did not occur.  However, there are different ways of lying, 
and these lies may have differential effects on memory.  For instance, Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, 
Thompson, and Yurgelun-Todd (2003) showed that different types of lies can activate different 
brain areas (e.g., lies that were based on a well-rehearsed story more strongly activated the right 
anterior middle frontal gyrus than did lies that were spontaneously generated).  And although 
lying is understood to be a more cognitively demanding process than telling the truth (see Vrij et 
al., 2010 for review), some lies may be more or less cognitively demanding than others.  For 
example, having to create a false description of something you never actually saw may be more 
cognitively demanding than falsely saying you did not see something you really did see.  Given 
the varied nature of lying, these different types of lies may impact memory differentially.  This 
issue has implications not only for theoretical understanding, but also for the legal system.  
Witnesses may lie to investigators for various reasons, and in various ways.  If a witness loses 
the ability to distinguish between what he or she has lied and told the truth about, this could have 
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serious ramifications for the outcome of an investigation.  The current study, therefore, 
investigated the impact of telling different types of lies (i.e., falsely describing never-seen items 
and falsely denying having seen studied items) on a person’s source memory. 
The first type of lie used in the current study – lying by describing something that was 
not actually seen – is similar to the type of lies Polage (2004) had her participants tell (although 
Polage’s study was more autobiographical in nature).  The memorial effects of creating false 
descriptions have also been studied in eyewitness suggestibility paradigms (Lane & Zaragoza, 
2007).  Across two experiments, Lane and Zaragoza (2007) showed that generating false 
descriptions of suggested items increased accurate source memory of having read the suggested 
items in the post-event questions, but also increased inaccurate source memory for having seen 
the suggested items in the originally viewed slides.  Although these results seem to differ from 
Polage’s, it is important to remember that participants in Lane and Zaragoza’s study were not 
deliberately producing misinformation.  Furthermore, Lane and Zaragoza’s procedure included 
items that were actually in both sources (i.e., “both” items).  Thus, having a clear memory of 
having generated details about a suggested item did not necessarily exclude the possibility that 
they had also seen it in the slides.  Lying by describing is also a very resource-intensive process 
(e.g., Gombos, 2006; Walczyk, Roper, Seeman, & Humphrey, 2003).  According to the source-
monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993), this cognitively demanding process could generate 
features consistent with a seen item, but would also generate cognitive operations involved in 
producing the description.  If this information is remembered at test, this would allow people to 
accurately remember having lied.  
The second type of lie used in the current study was lying by falsely denying having seen 
an item that was actually seen.  Denying seeing something is conceptually similar to directed 
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forgetting research, where participants are told to forget specific items or lists of items (e.g., 
Bjork & Woodward, 1973; see also the think/no think paradigm, e.g., Anderson & Green, 2001).  
The general finding of this research is that intentional forgetting (or suppression) reduces later 
memory for the item.  Note that researchers in this area typically don’t ask participants to 
retrospectively remember what they were trying to do during the previous “rehearsal period” 
(i.e., to remember or forget), but instead evaluate item memory.  This second type of lie may also 
be similar to research on simulated amnesia, where participants pretend that they do not 
remember details of an event (e.g., Christianson & Bylin, 1999; Van Oorsouw & Merckelbach, 
2004).  For instance, Van Oorsouw and Merckelbach (2004) had participants commit a mock 
crime and then had some participants simulate amnesia (i.e., pretend that they had trouble 
remembering what happened).  They found that one week later, participants who had simulated 
amnesia and those in a no-rehearsal control group had worse memories for details of the original 
crime event compared to participants who had previously described the event truthfully.  
Although the participants who simulated amnesia were only claiming that they could not 
remember the crime details, rather than explicitly stating they did not take part in the crime, the 
memorial effects of “forgetting” certain details may be similar to the memorial effects of denying 
having seen certain items.  But again, this study only evaluated item memory, rather than 
memory for having simulated amnesia or not.  Another thing to note about falsely denying 
having seen something is that it may be a less cognitively demanding process than lying by 
falsely describing something.  Rather than having to create false details that would seem 
believable, the participant only need say that they did not see the item.  According to the source-
monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993), this process should generate relatively few 
cognitive operations, thereby making this act of lying less memorable.  
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In addition to the type of lie that is told, another key manipulation in the current 
experiment concerns the manipulation of repetition.  Specifically, participants will either lie or 
tell the truth about a picture once or thrice.  The effect of this manipulation will be measured 
according to accuracy on source memory (i.e., whether items were studied or not, whether items 
were rehearsed or not, and if rehearsed, how so).  The impact of repetition has the potential to 
improve memory for having lied or told the truth about an item.  For example, in research 
examining the impact of repetition of misinformation in the eyewitness suggestibility paradigm 
(e.g., Zaragoza & Mitchell, 1996), repetition increases memory for having encountered the items 
in the context of the questionnaire.  However, repetition also has the potential to harm source 
memory.  For instance, Goff and Roediger (1998) had participants perform, imagine performing, 
or not perform a series of simple actions.  Participants then imagined performing these actions 
various amounts of times.  Later, they returned and were tested on their memories for which 
actions they had actually performed.  Goff and Roediger found that the more participants 
imagined performing an action they had originally just heard or imagined, the more they 
incorrectly believed that they had actually performed the action in real life.  Consistent with the 
source-monitoring framework, Goff and Roediger argued that repeatedly imagining the 
perceptual features of an event led the imagined actions to have similar perceptual features to the 
actually performed actions.  Because of this similarity, the sources of imagined and perceived 
memories were highly confusable.  Similarly, one can assume that when a person lies by 
describing something they haven’t seen, they are imaging perceptual details about an event.  
When a person repeatedly lies they will be repeatedly imagining these perceptual details, making 
them more similar to and therefore more confusable with actually perceived details.  Similarly, 
repeatedly suggesting misinformation increases participants’ misattributions to the witnessed 
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event (e.g., Zaragoza & Mitchell, 1996) despite improved memory for also having read it in the 
questionnaire. 
Current Experiment 
The goal of the current study was to investigate the impact of telling different types of 
lies (i.e., falsely describing never-seen items and falsely denying having seen studied items) on a 
person’s ability to determine the origin of a memory (i.e., their source memory).  Furthermore, 
we assessed whether repetition would influence the effects of these different types of lies.  This 
study consisted of three phases: a study phase, a rehearsal phase, and a test phase.  During the 
study phase, participants viewed a series of pictures of objects and object labels.  Then in the 
rehearsal phase, all participants later lied about some items and told the truth about others by 
describing the picture items or by denying they had seen them (i.e., a within-subjects design).  
Some items were rehearsed (i.e., lied or told the truth about) once, while others were rehearsed 
thrice.  There was also a set of control items that did not appear during this rehearsal phase.  Of 
these control items, some appeared during the study phase (i.e., they were studied but not 
rehearsed), and some did not appear during the study phase (i.e., they were neither studied nor 
rehearsed).  Participants were videotaped while they provided their verbal responses, and a 
monetary reward was offered for the most successful deceiver (i.e., the person who provided the 
most believable lies).  After completing the rehearsal task, participants returned two days later to 
complete the test phase, where they were tested on their memories for what happened during 
Session 1.  Specifically, they completed a test that assessed their memories for the sources of 
information they encountered in Session 1 (i.e., whether items were studied or not, whether items 
were rehearsed or not, and if rehearsed, how so).  
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The first hypothesis is that participants will be more likely to remember having lied by 
falsely describing something than to remember having lied by falsely denying something.  This 
hypothesis is based on the assumption that lying by describing involves greater effort and 
constructive processing such that participants should have better memory for the cognitive 
operations involved.  According to the source-monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993), this 
should allow participants to more accurately remember the source of their memories.  Note this 
hypothesis also suggests that participants will have poor memory for having previously denied 
seeing a studied picture.   
 The second hypothesis is that repetition will generally increase the accuracy of source 
memory for all rehearsed items, with one potential exception.  In the case of descriptions, this is 
particularly clear because participants are cued repeatedly to construct descriptions, which 
should mean that participants should have stronger memory for the cognitive operations 
involved.  Although repetition is likely to improve source accuracy for denials too, there is a 
potential that repetition could increase source-monitoring errors to items that were truthfully 
denied as well.  This is because denial involves far less effort and constructive processing and 
thus, fewer cognitive operations.  Thus, participants are likely to have poor memory for having 
made a denial.  However, repetition is also known to increase the fluency of such items (e.g., the 
illusory truth effect; Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992).  If such fluency is not accompanied by 






 Twenty-four undergraduate students (19 females, 5 males) from Louisiana State 
University participated for partial course credit.  Normal, or corrected to normal, vision was 
required for participation.  Mean age was 20.08 years.  Sign-ups were conducted through the 
SONA system. 
Materials  
 Stimuli were pictures of simple objects taken from Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, and Oliva 
(2008).  Participants’ verbal responses during the rehearsal phase in Session 1 were recorded 
using a camcorder, which sat on top of a tripod.  
Design and Procedure 
This study followed a 2 (Veracity: Lie, Truth) x 2 (Rehearsal Type: Deny, Describe) x 2 
(Repetition: Once, Thrice) within-subjects factorial design.  There were two additional types of 
control items: studied-no rehearsal items and unstudied- no rehearsal items.  Thus, there were 10 
types of items: 1) studied lie-deny once items (items that participants studied and later rehearsed 
once by falsely denying they had seen the corresponding picture), 2) studied lie-deny thrice items 
(items that participants studied and later rehearsed three times by falsely denying they had seen 
the corresponding picture), 3) studied truth-describe once items (items that participants studied 
and later rehearsed once by truthfully describing the corresponding studied picture), 4) studied 
truth-describe thrice items (items that participants studied and later rehearsed three times by 
truthfully describing the corresponding studied picture), 5) studied no-rehearsal items (i.e., items 
that participants studied but did not rehearse), 6) unstudied truth-deny once items (i.e., items that 
participants did not study and later rehearsed once by truthfully denying they had seen the 
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corresponding picture), 7) unstudied truth-deny thrice items (i.e., items that participants did not 
study and later rehearsed three times by truthfully denying they had seen the corresponding 
picture), 8) unstudied lie-describe once items (i.e., items that participants did not study and later 
rehearsed once by falsely describing the item as if they had seen the corresponding picture), 9) 
unstudied lie-describe thrice items (i.e., items that participants did not study and later rehearsed 
three times by falsely describing the item as if they had seen the corresponding picture), and 10) 
unstudied no-rehearsal items (i.e., items that participants did not study and did not later 
rehearse).  Item type was counterbalanced so that across the experiment, each item was presented 
as each item type.  
Participants were run individually across two sessions.  Upon arrival to the lab for the 
first session, participants read and signed an informed consent.  Participants then began the study 
phase, before which they were told that they would view a series of pictures on the computer 
screen, and to pay close attention to all of the items as they would be tested on them later.  They 
then viewed a series of 26 pictures (two of which were later used as practice items).  Under each 
picture appeared an item label (e.g., apple).  Each study item appeared on the screen for 5000 
ms, with a 1000 ms ISI between items.  
After the study phase, participants entered the rehearsal phase (which began with four 
practice trials).  During this phase, a series of labels was presented on the screen.  Some of these 
labels corresponded to pictures that were presented during the study phase (i.e., studied items) 
and others did not correspond to pictures presented during the study phase (i.e., unstudied items).  
Along with each label were instructions to lie or tell the truth about the corresponding picture.  
For studied items, participants would lie by falsely saying that they had not seen the picture (i.e. 
studied lie-deny once items and studied lie-deny thrice items), or they would tell the truth by 
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accurately describing the picture they saw (i.e., studied truth-describe once items and studied 
truth-describe thrice items).  For unstudied items, participants would tell the truth by saying that 
they had not seen the picture (i.e., unstudied truth-deny once items and unstudied truth-deny 
thrice items), or they would lie by falsely describing the picture as if they had seen it (i.e., 
unstudied lie-describe once items and unstudied lie-describe thrice items).  So, for example, 
participants would see the word house on the screen.  If a picture of a house was studied during 
the study phase, they would see one of the following instructions under this label: tell the 
TRUTH by accurately describing the house or LIE by saying that you did not see the house.  If a 
picture of a house was not studied during the study phase, they would see one of the following 
instructions under the label: tell the TRUTH by saying that you did not see the house or LIE by 
falsely describing the house.  Participants were told to keep their responses consistent for 
repeated items.  There were four items of each item type presented during the rehearsal phase 
(i.e., studied lie-deny once, studied lie-deny thrice, studied truth-describe once, studied truth-
describe thrice, unstudied truth-deny once, unstudied truth-deny thrice, unstudied lie-describe 
once, and unstudied lie-describe thrice items).  Therefore, with repeats, the 32 rehearsal items 
were presented across 64 rehearsal trials.  Control items (i.e., studied no-rehearsal items and 
unstudied no-rehearsal items) did not appear during the rehearsal phase.    
Participants responded aloud to each item according to the presented instructions while 
being video recorded.  The camcorder was positioned so that their faces and upper bodies were 
captured, but not the computer screen or keyboard.  Participants were told that another group of 
people would later be watching their video footage and attempting to detect their lies, and that 
the participant who was rated to be the most believable would receive $50.  After participants 
provided a response to any given item, the experimenter clicked the mouse and the next rehearsal 
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item appeared on the computer screen.  After completing the rehearsal phase, participants 
answered a series of post-session questions.  After answering these questions, they were 
dismissed from Session 1. 
Forty-eight hours later participants returned for Session 2, during which they completed a 
48-item source test.  It was emphasized to them that their responses during Session 2 should be 
completely truthful (i.e., based on what they actually saw).  During the source test, a series of 
labels naming both studied and unstudied pictures appeared on the screen.  For each label, 
participants chose one of six response options that best described the corresponding item: 1) I 
studied this item but falsely denied seeing it on camera, 2) I studied this item and truthfully 
described it on camera, 3) I studied this item but did not talk about it on camera, 4) I did not 
study this item and truthfully denied seeing it on camera, 5) I did not study this item but falsely 
described it on camera, and 6) I did not study this item and did not talk about it on camera.  
There were eight test items that corresponded to each of the six possible response options (i.e., 
“sources”).  After the source test, participants completed a cued recall measure.  This measure is 






 One key assumption of the hypotheses is that participants would exert more effort (and 
thus increase the availability of cognitive operations) when they described pictures than when 
they denied having seen them.  After completing the rehearsal phase, participants were asked to 
rate the difficulty of rehearsing each different item type on a scale of 1 (not at all difficult) to 7 
(very difficult).  On average, participants rated the difficulty of truthfully describing an item as 
3.67 (SD = 1.71), the difficulty of truthfully denying an item as 2.13 (SD = 1.57), the difficulty 
of falsely describing an item as 4.21 (SD = 2.15), and the difficulty of falsely denying an item as 
2.08 (SD = 1.28).  A 2 (Veracity: Lie, Truth) x 2 (Rehearsal Type: Deny, Describe) repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted on reported difficulty.  There was a significant main effect of 
Rehearsal Type, F(1, 23) = 23.10, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .50.  As predicted, participants rated describing 
(M = 3.94, SE = .30) as more difficult than denying (M = 2.10, SE = .26).  There was no main 
effect of Veracity, F(1, 23) = .59, p = .45, ηp
2 
= .03.  There was no significant interaction, F(1, 
23) = 1.02, p = .323, ηp
2 
= .04. 
Source Memory Accuracy 
As mentioned previously, participants had six possible response options for each test 
item: I studied this item but falsely denied seeing it on camera, I studied this item and truthfully 
described it on camera, I studied this item but did not talk about it on camera, I did not study this 
item and truthfully denied seeing it on camera, I did not study this item but falsely described it 
on camera, and I did not study this item and did not talk about it on camera.  Source test 
responses were considered accurate if the participant correctly categorized what happened with 
that item in both the study phase and the rehearsal phase (e.g., a studied lie-deny once item that 
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was correctly classified as “I studied this item but falsely denied seeing it on camera”).  Source 
test responses were considered inaccurate if the participant did not correctly categorize what 
happened with that item in both the study and rehearsal phases (e.g., if a studied lie-deny once 
item was incorrectly classified as “I did not study this item and truthfully denied seeing it on 
camera”).   
To compare source test accuracy for the different item types, a 2 (Veracity: Lie, Truth) x 
2 (Rehearsal Type: Deny, Describe) x 2 (Repetition: Once, Thrice) repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted on the mean proportion of accurate source test responses for all item types that 
were rehearsed.  As seen in Figure 1, there was a main effect of Rehearsal Type, F(1, 23) = 
243.98, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .91.  As predicted, source accuracy was significantly higher for items that  
 
Figure 1. Mean proportion of correct source responses for each item 
type. Error bars represent mean standard errors. 
 
were described (M = .80, SE = .03) than for items that were denied (M = .23, SE = .03).  Notably, 
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primarily from forgetting the act of denying rather than forgetting having studied the item.  As 
can be seen in Table 1, the predominant source response to studied lie-deny once and studied lie-
deny thrice items was “I studied this item but did not talk about it on camera.”  As predicted, 
there was also a main effect of Repetition, F(1, 23) = 8.06, p = .009, ηp
2
 = .26.  Source accuracy 
was significantly higher for items that were rehearsed thrice (M = .59, SE = .04) than for items 
that were rehearsed once (M = .45, SE = .03).  There was no main effect of Veracity, F(1, 23) = 
0.01, p = .928, ηp
2
 ≈ .0001.  Source accuracy did not differ for items that were lied about (M = 
.52, SE = .03) and those that were told the truth about (M = .52, SE = .03).  There was no 
significant interaction between Veracity and Rehearsal Type, F(1, 23) = 1.94, p = .177, ηp
2
 = .08.  
There was no significant interaction between Veracity and Repetition, F(1, 23) = 1.83, p = .189, 
ηp
2
 = .07.  There was no significant interaction between Rehearsal Type and Repetition, F(1, 23) 
= .89, p = .355, ηp
2
 = .04.  Finally, there was no significant three-way interaction between 
Veracity, Rehearsal Type, and Repetition, F(1, 23) = .98, p = .332, ηp
2
 = .04.  See Table 1 for 
descriptive statistics of accurate and inaccurate responses for each item type. 
Accurate and False Memory for Having Studied Items 
 The above analysis assessed how precisely participants remembered encountering the 
items in both the study phase and the rehearsal phase.  However, another important question 
concerns how the manipulations affected participants’ memories for having studied a picture, 
regardless of whether or not they remember if and how it was rehearsed.  Thus, source 
performance was assessed in two additional ways: 1) the rate of accurately remembering having 
seen a studied item during the study phase, and 2) the rate of inaccurately “remembering” having 
seen an unstudied item during the study phase.  To obtain these measures, participants’ responses 
were classified as “studied” or “unstudied.”  More specifically, for any given test item, responses  
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Table 1  
Mean Proportion of Source Responses for Each Item Type 
 
  Response Options 
Item Type 
"I studied this 
item but 
falsely denied 
seeing it on 
camera" 
"I studied 





this item but 
did not talk 
about it on 
camera" 
"I did not 
study this item 
and truthfully 
denied seeing 
it on camera" 
"I did not study 
this item but 
falsely 
described it on 
camera" 
"I did not 
study this 
item and did 
not talk 
about it on 
camera" 
Studied Lie-Deny Once .18 (.03) .03 (.02) .53 (.05) .08 (.03) .02 (.01) .16 (.04) 
Studied Lie-Deny Thrice .35 (.07) .05 (.03) .34 (.05) .09 (.04) .00 (.00) .16 (.04) 
Studied Truth-Describe Once .04 (.02) .81 (.04) .04 (.02) .00 (.00) .09 (.03) .01 (.01) 
Studied Truth-Describe Thrice .02 (.02) .85 (.06) .01 (.01) .00 (.00) .08 (.04) .03 (.03) 
Studied No Rehearsal .02 (.01) .01 (.01) .51 (.04) .03 (.01) .03 (.01) .41 (.04) 
Unstudied Truth-Deny Once .01 (.01) .00 (.00) .10 (.03) .13 (.04) .00 (.00) .76 (.05) 
Unstudied Truth-Deny Thrice .06 (.03) .00 (.00) .22 (.06) .28 (.06) .02 (.01) .42 (.06) 
Unstudied Lie-Describe Once .02 (.01) .05 (.02) .05 (.02) .06 (.03) .68 (.07) .14 (.05) 
Unstudied Lie-Describe Thrice .03 (.02) .07 (.04) .00 (.00) .01 (.01) .85 (.06) .03 (.03) 
Unstudied No Rehearsal .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .08 (.03) .04 (.02) .01 (.01) .86 (.04) 
 
Note. Values for correct source responses are in boldface. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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of “I studied this item but falsely denied seeing it on camera”, “I studied this item and truthfully 
described it on camera”, and “I studied this item but did not talk about it on camera” were 
collapsed into a studied response category (i.e., the participant indicated that the test item was 
seen during the study phase).  Likewise, responses of “I did not study this item and truthfully 
denied seeing it on camera”, “I did not study this item but falsely described it on camera”, and “I 
did not study this item and did not talk about it on camera” were collapsed into an unstudied 
response category (i.e., the participant indicated that the test item was not seen during the study 
phase).  See Table 2 for descriptive statistics. 
Table 2 
 
Mean Proportion of “Studied” Responses for Each Item Type 
 
Item Type   Mean   SE 
Studied Lie-Deny Once  .74  .05 
Studied Lie-Deny Thrice  .75  .06 
Studied Truth-Describe Once  .90  .03 
Studied Truth-Describe Thrice  .89  .05 
Studied No Rehearsal  .53  .04 
Unstudied Truth-Deny Once  .11  .03 
Unstudied Truth-Deny Thrice  .28  .05 
Unstudied Lie-Describe Once  .13  .04 
Unstudied Lie-Describe Thrice  .10  .04 
Unstudied No Rehearsal  .09   .03 
 
Note. Values for correct “studied” responses are in boldface. 
 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of each 
studied item type (i.e., studied lie-deny once, studied lie-deny thrice, studied truth-describe once, 
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studied truth-describe thrice, and studied no rehearsal) on the mean proportion of accurate 
“studied” responses (i.e., accurate recognition).  There was a significant effect of item type, F(4, 
92) = 13.35, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .37.  Four follow-up paired samples t-tests were conducted to 
compare accurate recognition for each studied item type that was rehearsed (i.e., studied lie-deny 
once, studied lie-deny thrice, studied truth-describe once, and studied truth-describe thrice) to 
performance on the studied no-rehearsal control items.  One follow-up paired-samples t-test was 
conducted to compare accurate recognition for studied lie-deny items and studied truth-describe 
items (i.e., when collapsed across repetition).  A Bonferroni correction was applied to these 
follow-up t-tests (p < .01).  All four rehearsal types differed significantly from the studied no-
rehearsal condition.  Specifically, accurate recognition was greater for studied lie-deny once 
items (M = .74, SD = .24) than for studied no-rehearsal items (M = .53, SD = .21), t(23) = 4.92, p 
< .001.  Accurate recognition was greater for studied lie-deny thrice items (M = .75, SD = .29) 
than for studied no-rehearsal items, t(23) = 3.0, p = .006.  Accurate recognition was greater for 
studied truth-describe once items (M = .90, SD = .16) than for studied no-rehearsal items, t(23) = 
7.23, p < .001.  Accurate recognition was greater for studied truth-describe thrice items (M = .89, 
SD = .23) than for studied no-rehearsal items, t(23) = 6.89, p < .001.  Thus, both lying and 
describing had the effect of increasing accurate claims of having studied relative to a control 
condition.  However, as can be seen in Table 2, denials appeared to lead to poorer retention than 
descriptions.  In order to compare accuracy for studied lie-deny versus studied truth-describe 
items, studied lie-deny once and studied lie-deny thrice items were collapsed into one studied lie-
deny category, and studied truth-describe once and studied truth-describe thrice items were 
collapsed into one studied truth-describe category.  Participants were significantly more accurate 
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in remembering having studied items that were later truthfully described (M = .89, SD = .15) 
compared to items that were later falsely denied (M = .74, SD = .23), t(23) = -3.34, p = .003.  
 A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of each 
unstudied item type (i.e., unstudied truth-deny once, unstudied truth-deny thrice, unstudied lie-
describe once, unstudied lie-describe thrice, and unstudied no rehearsal) on the mean proportion 
of inaccurate “studied” responses (i.e., false recognition).  Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ
2
(9) = 17.59, p = .041.  Therefore, 
degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = 0.7).  
There was a significant effect of Item Type, F(2.80, 64.36) = 4.97, p = .004, ηp
2 
= .18.  Four 
follow-up paired samples t-tests were conducted to compare false recognition for each unstudied 
item type that was rehearsed (i.e., unstudied truth-deny once, unstudied truth-deny thrice, 
unstudied lie-describe once, and unstudied lie-describe thrice) to false recognition for unstudied 
no-rehearsal control items.  A Bonferroni correction was applied to these follow-up t-tests (p < 
.01).  The only unstudied rehearsal type that differed significantly in false recognition from the 
unstudied no-rehearsal items was the unstudied truth-deny thrice item type.  Specifically, false 
recognition did not differ for unstudied truth-deny once items (M = .12, SD = .16) and unstudied 
no-rehearsal items (M = .09, SD = .17), t(23) = .68, p = .504.  False recognition did not differ for 
unstudied lie-describe once items (M = .13, SD = .18) and unstudied no-rehearsal items, t(23) = 
.86, p = .397.  False recognition did not differ for unstudied lie-describe thrice items (M = .10, 
SD = .22) and unstudied no-rehearsal items, t(23) = .36, p = .726.  However, false recognition 
was significantly greater for unstudied truth-deny thrice items (M = .28, SD = .27) than for 
unstudied no-rehearsal items, t(23) = 3.20, p = .004.  To follow-up on this finding, and to 
demonstrate the role of repetition in increased false recognition, performance in the unstudied 
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truth-deny once and thrice items were contrasted in a final t-test.  This revealed that participants 
were in fact more likely to falsely recognize an unstudied item when that item had previously 
been truthfully denied three times (M = .28, SD = .27) than when it had previously been 
truthfully denied once (M = .11, SD = .16), t(23) = -4.00.  Thus, repeated truthful denials of 
having seen unstudied items had the paradoxical effect of later increasing false recognition.  
Source Accuracy Response Times 
 Participants’ response times on the source test were collected and used as an indicator of 
the accessibility of information for source decisions.  A 2 (Veracity: Lie, Truth) x 2 (Rehearsal 
Type: Deny, Describe) x 2 (Repetition: Once, Thrice) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted on mean median response time (RT) for source test responses.  There was a main 
effect of Veracity, F(1, 23) = 25.33, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .52.  Participants were significantly slower in 
responding to items that were lied about during the rehearsal phase (M = 5821.16, SE = 292.13) 
than to items that were truthfully rehearsed (M = 4878.69, SE = 280.58).  Thus, in contrast to the 
null effect of veracity in the source accuracy data, it appears that lying had the effect of slowing 
test responses 48 hours later.  There was no significant main effect of Rehearsal Type, F(1, 23) = 
3.98, p = .058, ηp
2 
= .15.  There was no significant effect of Repetition, F(1, 23) = 3.89, p = .061, 
ηp
2 
= .15.  However, there was a significant interaction between Rehearsal Type and Repetition, 
F(1, 23) = 7.60, p = .011, ηp
2 
= .25.  Follow-up t-tests revealed that participants were slower in 
responding to items that they had previously denied thrice (M = 6053.97, SD = 2404.85) 
compared to items that they had previously denied once (M = 5026.72, SD = 1857.96), t(29) = -
2.70, p = .012.  However, response time did not significantly differ for items that they had 
previously described thrice (M = 4740.1, SD = 1387.01) compared to items that they had 
previously described once (M = 5146.5, SD = 1070.25), t(29) = 1.60, p = .121.  In other words, 
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repeated denials (whether truthful or not) had the effect of slowing responses, while repeated 




In the current study, participants lied or told the truth by describing items or denying they 
had seen them, rehearsing some items once and others thrice.  Two days later they returned to 
complete a source test.  Consistent with the predictions of the source-monitoring framework, the 
act of denial was less memorable than was the act of falsely describing.  Additionally, repeated 
lying increased source memory accuracy for both lie types.  Interestingly, repetition did increase 
one type of source monitoring error: Repeated truthful denials of having seen never-studied 
pictures later increased incorrect claims of having studied those pictures. 
These findings both support and extend Polage’s (2004) work on lying and memory.  
Polage found that having participants repeatedly create false details of a childhood event that 
never occurred led most participants to become more confident that these events did not happen.  
In line with Polage’s findings, having participants create false descriptions of items that were 
never actually seen led to more accurate memories that these items had never been studied, a 
finding that became stronger with repetition.  However, the current study also showed that lying 
does not always strengthen source memory accuracy.  When participants lied by falsely denying 
having seen an item, they were less likely to remember having lied about this item. 
On the face of it, the current findings seem to conflict with those of Pickel (2004).  Pickel 
found that falsely describing the appearance of a target character led to less accurate memories 
for that character.  However, Pickel tested her participants one week after lying.  Over the 48-
hour delay of this experiment, participants seemed to remember having constructed their false 
description, which allowed them to accurately remember having lied.  It may be possible that 
with extended time people would only remember the constructed details, but not the act of 
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construction.  This forgetting might lead them to falsely claim to have seen the pictures in the 
present study.   
The findings of the current study are consistent with the source-monitoring framework 
and previous empirical research on source monitoring.  Participants’ poorer source memory for 
deny items relative to describe items indicates that the deny items had fewer associated features 
– presumably the cognitive operations involved in creating the lie – that could be used to 
accurately discern their original source.  Furthermore, the act of repetition increased source 
memory accuracy (see also Zaragoza & Mitchell, 1996), a finding that is consistent with the 
prediction that repetition should increase the number or strength of encoded features.   
However, repetition also led to a certain type of false memory: With repetition, items that 
were truthfully denied were increasingly likely to be incorrectly called “studied.”  Because the 
act of denying was so easily forgotten, repeatedly denying an item may have simply increased 
that item’s familiarity without increasing memory for the source of that familiarity.  Such effects 
of repetition-induced familiarity and the resulting errors in source monitoring have been 
investigated in other lines of research.  For instance, work on the illusory truth effect shows that 
repeatedly presenting statements that were previously classified as false can lead people to later 
rate these statements as true.  This finding is presumably caused by the persistence of familiarity 
even when recollection is impaired (Begg et al., 1992).  Work on the false fame effect shows that 
repeatedly presenting non-famous names can lead participants to later rate these names as 
famous, if they do not remember having previously studied the non-famous names (Jacoby, 
Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989).  This research emphasizes the role of recollection in opposing 
familiarity.  The effects of relying on such familiarity in the absence of recollection can be 
conceptually related to the current study’s finding of increased incorrect “studied” responses to 
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items that participants had truthfully denied seeing multiple times.  If participants had in fact 
recollected how those items were processed in the rehearsal phase, they would have remembered 
truthfully denying them.  But, because denials were not memorable, the familiarity associated 
with repeated rehearsals was apparently misattributed to the familiarity of having seen the item 
in the study phase. 
The current study has several strengths.  First, the findings show that different types of 
lies can have different effects on source memory.  These findings, along with related 
neuroimaging research (e.g., Ganis et al., 2003; Ganis, Morris, & Kosslyn, 2008), suggest that 
researchers should take into account the variability of lies when studying deception.  Second, 
unlike previous research on lying (e.g., Polage, 2004), repetition was directly manipulated.  This 
manipulation was critical in uncovering, for example, the paradoxical effects of repeatedly 
denying seeing unstudied items on source misattribution errors.  Third, through our post-session 
questions and response time measures, we were able to assess the impact of lying beyond what 
could be observed from test accuracy.  The post-session questions revealed that lying, which is 
generally understood to be a very cognitively demanding task, can actually vary in perceived 
difficulty depending on what type of lie is told.  Furthermore, the difference in response times 
between lie and truth items indicates that some effects of lying may persist even when memory 
accuracy is not affected.    
Despite these strengths, the current study was not without limitations.  First, although 
different types of lies were used (i.e., lying by describing and lying by denying), these are only 
two types of the many different lies that can be told.  Therefore, future work on lying and 
memory should take into consideration other types of lies (e.g., self-related versus other-related 
lies; see Ganis et al., 2008).  Second, although there was a benefit to our participants for lying 
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convincingly (i.e., the potential to win a $50 reward), there was essentially no consequence for 
them for not doing so.  In other words, this task utilized low-stakes lies.  In real life, however, 
there are high-stakes situations where being caught lying can have serious ramifications, such as 
prosecution.  It is unclear whether lying in these situations would have more or less of an effect 
on memory (and a matter for future research).  Regardless, these results still have relevance for 
real-world lying because people more commonly lie in lower stakes situations (e.g., a student 
who lies to a professor about the reasons for an absence).  Consistent with this argument, 
participants in the current study rated the frequency of telling serious lies in their own lives as 
very low (and lower than the frequency of telling minor “little white” lies), thus supporting the 
relevance of using such low-stakes lies in studies of deception. 
Although this is an initial study, there are nevertheless implications for the legal system.  
Although sometimes people may unwittingly describe their memories erroneously, other times 
such errors are deliberate, as with the opening example of a suspect being interviewed by an 
investigator.  The findings here indicate that in such a scenario, the interviewee may not always 
remember the source of such deliberate misinformation (i.e., themselves), particularly when they 
deny having seen something they actually saw.  In the context of repeated interviews, this might 
suggest that liars would be more likely to forget previous denials than they are to forget previous 
false descriptions.  Thus, investigators may be able to capitalize on this by structuring questions 
in later interviews in such a way that liars might end up contradicting themselves (e.g., by 
endorsing something that they previously denied).  However, the results also revealed a 
surprising way that repeated interviews might end up creating false memories.  Specifically, 
truthful repeated denials of having seen an item later led participants to incorrectly remember 
approximately 30% of the time that they had in fact seen the item.  Thus, there is a possibility 
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that interviewees might end up believing they actually remember incidents that they had been 
repeatedly questioned about. 
Everyone lies, but we can lie in different ways.  These differences matter when it comes 
to memory.  Specifically, the current findings suggest that certain types of lies may harm or help 
a person’s ability to accurately determine the source of such self-generated misinformation.  
Memory for such information is critical for consistently telling one’s story over time.  Thus, 
knowing more about how lying affects memory not only helps us to understand more about the 
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